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This commentary evaluates regulatory frameworks for the legalized production, sale, and use of marijuana. Specifically,
we argue that the primary goal of legalization should be the elimination of the illicit trade in marijuana and that
maximizing market participation through open markets and personal cultivation is the best approach to achieving this
goal. This argument is based on the assertion that regulatory models based on a tightly controlled government market
will fail because they replicate the fatal flaws of the prohibition model. This commentary argues that an examination of
the reasons for prohibition’s failure—to wit, the inability of government to control the production of marijuana—
completely undercuts the basic premise of a tightly controlled market, which depends on the ability of the government
to control production. The public interest would be better served by an effective regulatory framework which recognizes
and takes advantage of competitive market forces. This analysis argues that reducing teenage access to marijuana
requires the elimination of an overcapitalized illicit market. Further, it asserts that this goal and maximization of
tax revenue from a legal marijuana market are mutually exclusive objectives.
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Background
This article presents the case for legalizing marijuana by
way of a wide-open commercial, competitive market
including the allowance of small-scale cultivation for
personal use.
Big changes are occurring in the marijuana laws of the
United States. These changes are driven primarily through
voter initiative campaigns designed to bypass state legisla-
tures, garner majority public support, and accelerate a
decades-old trend of state departure from the prohib-
ition regimen of federal law. Outright legalization of the
use and commercial trade in marijuana has joined
decriminalization, prosecutorial discretion, conditional
discharge, and medical marijuana exemptions in the
catalogue of state tactics to opt out of the federal
criminalization of marijuana sales and possession and
the classification of marijuana as a drug similar to heroin
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article, unless otherwise stated.So, now that legalization is on the table, so to speak,
what sort of legalization is best for the public interest? The
answer is simple: the sort that works where the abandoned
policy of prohibition has failed. Many academics do not
seem to understand that simple point. The problem is
the issue of control, as in drug control, and the reality
of current policy is that there is no control. That is why
states have been and will continue to opt out of the rigid
federal prohibition. Some academics and policy officials
are now advocating new approaches based on a desire to
institute tight controls, conveniently overlooking that this
is the exact approach that created the current mess. This
article will review that perspective, expand on what the
lesson from prohibition should be, and apply this lesson
to defend open market solutions to the problems and
challenges of creating effective regulations for a legal
marijuana market.
The debate over marijuana policy is changing from
whether to legalize marijuana to how to regulate a legal
market. Criticism of marijuana prohibition is widespread,
and there is broad consensus among critics that it has
failed and why it has failed. Critiques are often based
on the persistence of wide and unchanged access tod Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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to provide medical access, racial disparities in marijuana
possession arrests, and the costs of arrests to both individ-
uals and society [1-3]. A considerable amount of discus-
sion has addressed the clash between state-level reforms,
such as medical marijuana laws, and the ongoing federal
prohibition in the United States [4-13]. This discussion
often focuses on a) ways to reconcile state reforms with
federal prohibition and b) the benefits of policy innovation
at the state level.
Legalization of marijuana at the state level in the
United States in Colorado and Washington, at the national
level in Uruguay, and the likelihood of additional state ac-
tion in the United States has generated a new round of
discussion. The focus has shifted to the objectives, dynam-
ics, potential features, and other critical issues concerning
regulatory frameworks for a legal marijuana market. Ex-
amples of this discussion are found in articles by Caulkins
et al. [14] and Room [15], along with additional commen-
tary by other authors, in the journal Addiction and a panel
discussion between Mark Klieman, Alison Holcomb, Sue
Rusche, and Jonathan Rauch sponsored by the New
American Foundation [16].
An initial approach rests on the premise that strict con-
trols on marijuana are justified by public health concerns.
Cohen and McGowan provide a straightforward synopsis
of popular thinking on this subject. They assert that the
goals of marijuana legalization should be controlling
consumption, eliminating the black market, and gener-
ating state revenues [17]. The best way to achieve these
objectives, they and others theorize, is through govern-
ment monopoly [16,18]. The rationale is that “keeping
marijuana out of the private marketplace allows states
more control in their vital role of limiting use by minors
[17].” Cohen and McGowan support their theory by evok-
ing the spectre of “Big Cannabis” which, like “Big Tobacco,”
will advertise and market marijuana to increase consump-
tion and stimulate teen use. State-run stores, according to
this proposition, have no incentive to promote sales [18].
Support for government monopoly is bolstered by the
fear that a dramatic drop in marijuana prices will lead to
increased consumption [14]. Taxes, then, should be used
to inflate marijuana prices, keeping them near or just
below current levels, to discourage consumption and
maximize tax revenues [16,18-20].
What is missing from these discussions, first of all, is a
realistic consideration of marijuana cultivation, particu-
larly personal or home cultivation. There are two notable
exceptions to this omission. Reuter observes that this may
be the only way to curtail commercialization but observes
that this would deny states tax revenue [21]. Caulkins
et al. concede there are many arguments for allowing
home cultivation, including diverting market share
from commercialized interests, sharing and gift giving,and fostering nonprofit cooperative efforts [14]. If mar-
ket forces can avert a price collapse, an important share
of the market could be seized by personal cultivation.
On the other hand, if prices do collapse, personal culti-
vation would be limited to hobbyists. Caulkins et al.
also express concern, however, that allowing home cul-
tivation would make it harder to regulate commercial
production and distribution [14].
What is also missing from these discussions is a general
awareness or recognition of how detached scholarly ana-
lysis of marijuana control efforts has been over the last sev-
eral decades. This can be evidenced by a general evaluation
of the accuracy of the data that informs such analysis and a
specific review of data relevant to a minimal assessment
of the impact of control efforts on participation in the
production and supply side of the market.
Regarding the accuracy of data, three revelations tell
the story, and the story is that whatever the government
thinks it knows about marijuana use and cultivation is
usually discovered to be only the tip of the iceberg. First,
in 1981, the DEA estimated that 1,200 metric tons of
marijuana was produced in the United States. In 1982,
they seized 1,653 metric tons. “Therefore, the program
shows that in 1982, 38% more domestic marihuana was
eradicated than was previously believed to exist [22].”
Second, in 2002, the National Survey on Drug Use and
Health (NSDUH) revised its data collection procedures
and increased their estimate of annual marijuana users
from 21.1 million (as reported in the 2001 survey results)
to 25.7 million [23,24]. Third, after reporting from 1998
to 2000 that domestic marijuana production was 3,500
metric tons [25], the Office of National Drug Control
Strategy reported in February 2003 that US production
was actually more than 10,000 metric tons [26]. This is
a recurring issue. A 2013 RAND study estimated that
the amount of marijuana consumed in the State of
Washington (120 to 175 metric tons) was considerably
greater than the earlier estimate of the Washington Of-
fice of Financial Management (85 metric tons) due to
underreporting in prior survey data [27].
Realistic evaluations of drug control efforts should look
at market participation, and this means producers and
sellers more so than users. Here, the available data, tip of
the iceberg or not, reinforces the conclusion that existing
efforts are unsatisfactory. Consider the following. Accord-
ing to Uniform Crime Reporting Program data, there were
67,485 arrests for marijuana sales in 1990, 74,208 in 2000,
87,759 in 2010, 76,404 in 2012, and an average of 76,266
from 1990 to 2012 [28]. This is significant not so much
with respect to program output or deterrence issues as it
is an indication of persistent market participation. Indeed,
the NSDUH provides estimates of the number of people
who sell illegal drugs in the United States; from 2003 to
2012, there were an average of 4,623,352 people selling
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given that marijuana is the most popular illegal drug, it
is another good indicator of the extent of market partici-
pation. Also, the Drug Enforcement Administration seized
3,347 indoor marijuana grow operations in 1993 (with
290,452 plants), 2,678 in 2003 (with 223,183 plants), 3,713
in 2007 (with 434,728 plants), and 2,596 grow rooms
in 2012 (with 302,377 plants) [30]. These data indicate
strong, persistent, and consistent levels of market partici-
pation in terms of production and sales. The NSDUH also
provides data on the number of personal-use marijuana
cultivators, which has increased dramatically from 206,335
in 2003 to 477,028 in 2012, an increase of 131% [29].
The evidence above indicates that a) the market in
marijuana is consistently found to be larger than previously
believed to exist, b) there is widespread and consistent par-
ticipation in production and sales, and c) involvement with
personal cultivation of marijuana is skyrocketing. Marijuana
prohibition of production and distribution is unen-
forceable. Any assertion that tight control of a legal
market through limiting participation and artificial price
inflation by way of taxation can be successful where pro-
hibition failed is dubious at best and flies in the face of the
historical experience and empirical evidence of the last
generation.
An alternative perspective
Marijuana’s prospective legalization should be viewed
simultaneously as a remedy to the failures of prohibition
and as a means to achieve important public policy objec-
tives. Ethan Nadelmann, Executive Director of the Drug
Policy Alliance, instructively notes that
“Any model for legally regulating cannabis production
and distribution must be compared not just with an
ideal scenario but with the realities of contemporary
cannabis prohibition” [31].
Public policy has much in common with scientific
theory, especially in terms of evaluation. Kuhn argues
that theories are best subject to the standards that
existed when they were first proposed [32]. In this manner,
Kaplan provides useful guidance for assessing why
marijuana prohibition has failed in the form of two crucial
observations:
“[A]n important factor in the success or failure of
any method of drug control is the degree to which
the users want the drug… [and] the technology of
drug production and consumption is an important
factor in the success or failure of a drug-control
measure. Where the technology of drug production
and distribution is not difficult to overcome, drug
control will be very difficult” [33].Marijuana, as a commodity for production, has unique
attributes that distinguish it from alcohol and tobacco. It
is relatively easy to grow and does not require industrial
processing. Marijuana can be produced anywhere by
just about anyone. It is grown throughout the country,
in backyards, closets, attics, basements, and warehouses.
While little technology is needed to grow marijuana, ample
technology to maximize production and yield are widely,
legally, available. This is a considerable factor in why pro-
hibition has failed to control the production of marijuana.
This will also be a considerable factor in the success or
failure of any alternative regulatory regime.
With respect to public policy, the purpose of regulation
should be to enhance protective factors and mitigate risk
factors. These objectives should take precedence over other
potential objectives, specifically maximizing tax revenue.
The necessity of many regulatory measures is widely
recognized. These include age and identification require-
ments for purchase, record-keeping, potential purchase
limitations, advertising and marketing restrictions, health
warnings and packaging requirements, and labelling stan-
dards [1,14,16].
While it may seem counterintuitive, the ubiquitous
nature of marijuana production can be a benefit rather
than a threat to achieving public policy objectives. The
concern with commercialization would be better expressed
as concern with the activity of an oligopolistic market
rather than a competitive one. Indeed, the current market
in tobacco is an oligopoly [34], and generic products
are viewed as an industry killer [35]. Home cultivation
of marijuana should likewise be viewed as an oligopoly
killer, consistent with the observations of Caulkins et al.
[14] and Reuter [27].
In addition to production, the other key element in
evaluating regulatory frameworks concerns Kaplan’s first
point, the degree to which users wish to use the drug. Con-
sideration of consumer interests should be a key compo-
nent of any discussion about regulatory objectives. There
are three important considerations. First, given the failure
of the compulsory prohibition, voluntary compliance
will be required for regulations to be successful. Second,
consumers have two major and self-evident complaints
about prohibition. They resent being subject to arrest and
other sanctions. And, like any consumers, they do not like
high prices. The third important consideration, discussed
below, regards the impact of regulations in terms of mar-
ket forces and how they influence competitive behavior
and the pursuit of profits.
Porter had detailed how five forces affect market compe-
tition and competition over profits and thus determine
operational strategies [36]. Public policy can influence
these strategies by influencing the nature of these com-
petitive forces. The five competitive forces that determine
the structure of market are 1) availability of substitute
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pliers, 4) leverage of consumers, and 5) rivalry among
competitors. The influence of each force varies from
market to market, and strategy is usually a response to
the most influential forces in a particular market. Gov-
ernment regulation typically has its greatest impact on
ease of entry into a market and by its impact on supply,
since regulation impacts price. In a regulated marijuana
market, given the widespread availability of production
technology, consumers are also potential suppliers. This
dual role gives them considerable influence over market
activity, influence comparable in importance to that of
regulatory provisions and the rivalry of competitors.
The influence of marijuana consumers will be an im-
portant determinant in the success of failure of any
regulatory framework for marijuana. Porter explains that
consumers, or buyers of products, act naturally in their
own interests to force down prices and bargain for quality
or services. The power of buyers depends on various cir-
cumstances, which include high prices relative to buyer in-
come, a market of standard or undifferentiated products,
low switching costs for changing suppliers, credible cap-
abilities for backward integration (meaning, self-supply),
and access to market data [36]. Limiting market access
and maintaining artificially high prices will enhance the
power of buyers; they will seek other sources and/or grow
marijuana for themselves and others.
This has not been adequately recognized in prior dis-
cussions of this issue. There is, consequently, a trade-off
between maximizing government revenue and reducing
black market production and sales. The trade-off has been
recognized, but the likely persistence and magnitude of
unlicensed cultivation in a strictly controlled market have
been overlooked.
The value of frameworks
Marijuana’s legalization raises numerous critical issues for
investigation and discussion, and articles such as this raise
far more questions than they can put to rest. This high-
lights, though, the need to examine this topic in terms of
regulatory frameworks and the general principles they
incorporate. The discussion above is meant to introduce
new elements to the consideration of prospective regula-
tory policy for marijuana such as a) the reason prohibition
has failed, b) the empirical limits on government’s capacity
to impose controls, and c) a more useful perspective or
model for understanding the forces affecting the market.
There is a simplifying assumption apparent here and
one that often gets lost in academic review and/or policy
analysis. This is the Jeffersonian proposition that people
affected by government action should have a voice and a
role in its formulation. In other words, the creation of reg-
ulations for the legalization of marijuana require input
from and support of the producers and consumers it willregulate to ensure the voluntary compliance required to
make new policies successful. The value of frameworks,
then, is that they organize critical issues and provide inter-
ested parties with clear choices.
The three models and their impact on competition and
price
The current regulatory model for marijuana is prohibition,
in which criminal law prohibits manufacture, distribution,
and possession of marijuana, and the resulting illegal mar-
ket is regulated solely through the tool of risk assessment.
Anyone willing to bear the risk of criminal prosecution
may enter and participate in the market. The illegality of
the market acts as price support. This is often explained in
terms of a risk premium. However, it can also be under-
stood as the result of an absence of consumer protections;
sellers are free to overcharge consumers, who have no re-
course. In other words, price fixing is also a characteristic
of the black market. The result is that competition is great
and prices are high.
The second type of model under consideration pro-
vides for legalization of marijuana and will be referred to
here as the interventionist model. This model has two
forms: A government monopoly (such as with alcohol sales
in 18 states) and a market with access determined by lim-
ited government licenses (such as the current legal market
for marijuana in Washington state). It can be characterized
in terms of limited market access, high prices, low levels of
competition among merchants, and high levels of tax rev-
enue. This approach is advanced in one form or another
by Brannon [20], Cohen and McGowan [17], Klieman,
Rauch, and Rusche in Glastris [16] Klieman [18], and
Pederson [37]. In either form, the result is that compe-
tition will be low and prices will remain high.
The third model, as proposed here, also provides for
legalization but instead is based on an open, competitive
market solution. In this model, aside from some perfunc-
tory regulatory requirements, market entry is unrestricted
and there will be a large number of producers; essentially,
anyone or any firm that is able to enter the market and will-
ing to bear the risks may participate. This includes,
most importantly, individuals who wish to grow marijuana
for their personal use and/or small-scale transfers to their
friends and associates. This level of competition will result
in substantially lower prices than the prices that exist in
the current market or would exist under the intervention-
ist model. The result is that competition will be high and
prices will be low.
The three models and their primary objectives
There are three popular theoretical justifications offered
for prohibition. The first is classic deterrence theory tied
to criminal and other sanctions. Punishment is meant
to provide specific deterrence to those prosecuted and
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with this rationale. Research on deterrence suggests that it
has little impact on expressive (rather than instrumental)
crimes, on high-committed offenders, and on private
rather than public crimes [38]. Another issue is certainty
of arrest and severity of punishment. Neither concern has
much relevance to the recent history of marijuana law en-
forcement in the United States. The second rationale for
prohibition, in terms of criminological theory, is social
learning theory, in which school authorities, police, mass
media, and other important influences affect learned be-
havior through promotion of rewards or punishments
[38]. The third justification for prohibition is that high
prices discourage use. It is important to note that the gov-
ernment and illicit merchants act in collusion under this
model, as high prices are widely seen as a deterrent to
drug us. Illicit merchants overcharge for their products,
fulfilling government policy of discouraging wider use
through artificially inflated prices.
In the interventionist model, the government, in effect,
nationalizes the illegal market. The objective is to keep
prices high but to lower the number of vendors and re-
allocate the transfer of wealth from criminal actors to
the government and its licensees. The rationale for this
model is threefold. First, the price of marijuana must be
kept high in order to discourage consumption. Second,
commercialization of marijuana must be prohibited in
order to prevent commercial inducements to the number
of consumers or the amount of consumption. Third, this
market structure will maximize government tax revenue.
The primary objective of the competitive model is more
modest. The open market model seeks to destroy the il-
legal market through the process of creative destruction.
This is a widely recognized economic doctrine introduced
by Schumpeter in which new combinations of goods and
services divert capital from existing markets to new mar-
ket, and thus, the creation of new markets destroys the
old ones [39]. In this context, an open competitive market
for marijuana’s production and distribution will a) reduce
and eliminate participation in the illicit market and b) pro-
vide a counterweight to monopolistic or oligopolistic com-
mercial excess.
Role of government
In the prohibition model, the government seeks to exert
control through the use of a single tool. This is often
conceived in terms of criminal sanctions, but in practice
and in terms of market forces this is really an attempt to
control the market by determining entry costs. The no-
tion that criminal penalties and law enforcement can
curtail this activity has already been disproven through
historical experience.
The interventionist model seeks to influence the market
through the use of three tools: central planning, tax policy,and consumer protection regulations. Central planning, it
is argued here, is problematic when it comes to a commod-
ity so easily and commonly produced without regard for
government policy. Tax policy will be addressed below. Con-
sumer protection regulations should be a component of any
regulatory policy for marijuana and are not at issue here.
The competitive open market model seeks to influence
the market through the use of competitive forces and,
like the interventionist model, consumer protection reg-
ulations. Incorporating existing producers into the mar-
ket through open access and personal cultivation not only
co-opts participation in the illegal market but also enhances
competition. A competitive market has many of the same
virtues of a large republic, calling to mind James Madison’s
admonition in Federalist #10 that multiple factions preserve
liberty through what in modern times has been referred to
as establishment of a balance of power [40]. This principle
also applies to competitors in economic markets. In polit-
ical markets, pluralism protects freedom. In economic
markets, pluralism protects consumers. In both markets,
pluralism protects the public interest.
The new regulated market must incorporate rather than
replace production from the current market. Many current
producers fear a corporate takeover of marijuana produc-
tion that would force them out of the business [41-43]. But
if the objective of a regulated market is to eliminate or
reduce the scope of the illegal market, there needs to be a
place in the new market for old producers; otherwise they
may continue production and undermine the regulated
market in much the same way as they undermine prohib-
ition. This argues against prohibiting individuals with
convictions for marijuana production or distribution crimes
from participating in the new, legalized market.
Tax revenues
The prohibition model does not provide tax revenue. In-
stead of benefits, it creates costs. On the other hand, the
interventionist model seeks to maximize tax revenue,
justifying this on the premise of reducing consumption,
but carries the risk of encouraging out-of-market behav-
ior. The idea of using tax policy to maintain prices for
marijuana at or near current levels is not unprecedented,
as attempts were made to apply this policy to alcohol after
the end of prohibition. The result is counterproductive.
For example, an analysis of the top activities of 162
soldiers of New York mafia families from 1950 to 1963
indicates that 11% were involved in evasion of alcohol
taxes through bootlegging or moonshining activities [44].
According to Hortis,
“Perhaps most surprising was the wise guys’ continued
role in illegal alcohol sales after the repeal of prohibition
in 1931. This was another example of how over-
regulation fostered organized crime. Through the
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high at $10.50 a gallon. (If the excise tax had kept up
with inflation, it would be $90 a gallon in 2013 dollars
instead of its current rate of $13.50) State and federal
regulations further drove up the price of booze” [45].
To maintain current prices through taxation requires
tax rates significantly higher, with respect to the costs of
production, than those applied now to alcohol. Given the
widespread recognition that marijuana is much less danger-
ous to use than alcohol, this begs the question as to how
taxing it at a much higher rate can be justified. Further-
more, as in the example above, such overregulation creates
classic opportunities for criminal profiteering.
Small-scale production and trade in marijuana are not
significant threats to tax revenue for two reasons. First,
there will not be substantial profits to be realized from
such activity because of relatively low prices. Second, most
consumers will be attracted to the commercial market
anyway. There will not be a high volume of untaxed com-
merce. Furthermore, the lack of a significant profit poten-
tial will mitigate against sales to minors and against sales
by minors to their peers (see below). A large number of
competitors will marginalize any benefits from marketing
to minors, since there is no guarantee or certainty that
such efforts will have significant impact on the marketer’s
own profits. Sales in the legal market will be diffused over
a large number of producers. Finally, consumers will
benefit from significant consumer savings compared to the
prior prohibition framework, enhancing their voluntary
participation and political support for this approach.
Impacts, illegal profits, and teenage marijuana use
Prohibition produces a highly capitalized black market
with moderate levels of competition in terms of price, qual-
ity, and service. While public health, theoretically, benefits
from discouragement of use, this benefit is offset by wide-
spread availability and unsustainable costs. Two primary
costs are the lack of tax revenue and the overall costs of
law enforcement. Additional costs include widespread teen-
age access to a market without age restrictions on pur-
chases and the availability of other illicit drugs to customers
of all ages. Social costs include various inequities such as
racial and other disparities in arrest rates. Costs to the
consumer include the potential costs of arrest and impris-
onment, other social sanctions such as loss of employment
due to drug testing or arrest, and the government-
sanctioned transfer of wealth from consumers to illicit
market participants.
Prohibition encourages participation in the illegal mar-
ket through artificially created profit potential. High prices
attract entrepreneurs; potential profit stimulates produc-
tion and distribution. In 1992, according to the NSDUH,
at least 1.1 million individuals sold illegal drugs. In 2002,this number increased to 3.5 million, and in 2012, it in-
creased again to 4.7 million [46]. Often overlooked in dis-
cussion of teenage marijuana access is how many teens
sell illegal drugs. In 1992, there were 313,000 teens selling
drugs, increasing to 1 million in 2002, and falling to
680,000 in 2012. These statistics suggest that our current
policy fails in part because prohibition makes it profitable
for teenagers to sell marijuana [29].
The interventionist model suffers from the same con-
straints as prohibition. The inability to enforce production
controls is why prohibition has failed and legalization is
being considered. Legal market success will rely on volun-
tary compliance by current consumers and producers; this
will not result by imposing a framework on the public.
The government’s ability to design, operate, and supervise
a multi-billion dollar market is questionable on practical
and philosophical grounds. On a practical basis, govern-
ment regulation routinely faces the risks of regulatory cap-
ture [14,47] and revenue addiction, making regulators and
politicians not only promoters but targets for corruption
as well [47]. This will be a problem for any regulatory
scheme. The stricter the controls, the more likely cor-
ruption, incompetency, or both will result. Woodruff,
from the National Review, observes that
“People who sell marijuana legally have to deal with a
lot of the same annoying, unsexy problems that other
businesses face, including cronyism and incompetent
bureaucratic oversight” [46].
On a philosophical level, there is considerable oppos-
ition in some circles to regulatory authority that allows
government to pick winners and losers, and to the concept
of central planning in general. The interventionist model
is, in effect, a proposal that bureaucratic nonspecialists
service a market of resentful consumers and successfully
compete with an up and running, unregulated, and profit-
able illicit market. The idea that the solution to the ills
of marijuana prohibition is to nationalize the market
through a government takeover fails to take into account
the very reasons for the existence of the problem it seeks
to resolve.
Competition will be limited in this model because the
rationing of licenses guarantees strong market shares for
licensees. There will not be as great of an incentive to
compete in terms of price, quality, and service in order to
make a profit. This lack of responsiveness to consumers,
along with high prices, will result in continued (and pre-
sumably) illicit home and small-scale production. Because
the cost of producing marijuana is relatively low, whatever
the fixed price of marijuana is, it will be undercut by illicit
producers seeking profits. Consequently, black market op-
portunities will persist. Teenagers will continue to have ac-
cess to marijuana through teen-to-teen sales and overall
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fit from consumer savings produced by a drop in the price
of marijuana.
The competitive open market model has advantages not
enjoyed by the other alternatives. Several observers have
already noted increasing differentiation in the various in-
terests in favor of marijuana’s legalization. This means,
using Madison’s terms, the emergence of competing fac-
tions with overlapping and at times conflicting interests.
Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug Policy
Alliance, told Rolling Stone that “the people who may
come to dominate this [new] industry are not necessar-
ily the people who are a part of the movement” [19], p.
35. Mark Klieman told the Washington Post that the pub-
lic interest and the goals of the legalization movement are
similar; it is the goals of the commercialization model that
clash with the public interest [48]. Caulkins cautions
that in any legal regime, there will be stakeholders with
a vested interest in preserving their livelihood [49]. The
way to control these competing interests is to enhance,
rather than restrict, competition.
Conclusions
What is missing from most analyses is recognition that
prohibition failed through an inability to control produc-
tion. Betsy Woodruff from the National Review put it
succinctly: “A big part of the problem is that the federal
government has a law that it can’t enforce” [46]. Any new
regulatory regime for marijuana must pass the enforce-
ment test. Continued prohibition of personal cultivation is
unenforceable. This is not the only problem with using
public policy to prop up the price of marijuana, regardless
of rationale or objective. High prices for marijuana provide
production incentives in a market for which there is not a
viable way to restrict production by regulation or criminal
sanction.
Under any of these frameworks, the key question with
respect to public health is how to protect vulnerable popu-
lations. Danovitch provides a good description of the
problem:
“Like most drugs, marijuana has some potential benefits
and some potential risks… most of the risks associated
with marijuana are moderate in severity, the prevalence
of marijuana use means that a sizeable minority of the
population is likely to experience some adverse effects.
Furthermore, three populations are particularly at risk
for the adverse effects of marijuana: youth, individuals
with mental illness, and pregnant or breastfeeding
women” [6], p. 107.
Each of these populations has unique features that
present public health challenges. Prohibition has not been
able to provide protection for any of them. One of themost compelling rationales for legalization is the need
to protect these at-risk populations more effectively.
Commercialization may complicate efforts to discourage
teenagers from using marijuana, but the real problem
there is what Caulkins has referred to as “the intrinsic
difficulty of changing teens’ behaviour” [49]. Klieman is
reconciled to the persistence of teenage marijuana use
even with a government monopoly, noting that it would
be better for teens to get marijuana through quasi-legal
sources than the black market [16], where they would
presumably have access to dangerous illegal drugs such as
opiates, cocaine, and methamphetamine. Individuals with
mental illness and pregnant or breastfeeding women are
problematic, just as with teenagers’ education, and preven-
tion and sometime interventionist approaches to counter
potentially risky behavior are required. In a competitive mar-
ket, there are more stakeholders and thus more incentives
to cooperate, fund, and otherwise support such measures.
The justification for the interventionist model (as for
prohibition) is that marijuana must be costly in order to
discourage use. This assertion must be subjected to critical
examination. Certainly, it is consistent with basic economic
logic. However, it should be assessed in light of additional
issues such as past performance and experience, the impact
of price on current usage patterns, the influence of potency
and tolerance on current use, and other relevant factors.
Marijuana is widely available under current conditions.
One could argue that high prices for marijuana have not
provided a significant constraint on its popularity.
Also, high prices may even, in some cases, facilitate
heavy use of marijuana. For example, under current market
conditions, heavy users have an incentive to grow and sell
marijuana in order to subsidize or cover the cost of their
own use. The relationship between substance use and drug
dealing among juveniles is well documented [50]. Selling
drugs is a sensible and logical way to both gain access and
reduce cost.
For the purposes of this critique of a tightly controlled
market, it will suffice to acknowledge that under legalization,
any form of legalization, the public will have greater access
to marijuana and that overall usage will increase. Nonethe-
less, the benefits of legalization are likely to offset or exceed
such an outcome. The benefits of legalization with respect
for public safety are summarized well by Roffman:
“I believe that prohibition’s track record in protecting
public health and public safety has been seriously
deficient. Moreover, inequities in prohibition’s
implementation make evident it has been fundamentally
flawed in terms of social justice. When the evaluation
data begin to become available over the coming years,
among the outcomes I hope to see, in contrast with
what we have witnessed prior to legalization, are: fewer
young people initiating marijuana use prior to age 21,
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users becoming marijuana dependent, more of those
who become dependent receiving effective treatment,
fewer traffic accidents in which marijuana smoking is a
contributing factor, and more accurate knowledge held
by the public concerning marijuana’s effects on health
and behaviour” [51].
The production issue makes it difficult if not impossible
to establish a closed market. This is one of the specific
goals of the Controlled Substances Act, and the failure to
achieve this is one of the most significant failures of the
prohibition model. It would, in due course, contribute to
the failure of the interventionist model as well. This leaves
policy makers with a dilemma. They must choose between
an effective regulatory framework that eliminates the black
market and a government takeover that produces signifi-
cant tax revenues but with many of the same costs and
externalities as prohibition.
Tax revenue should not be a primary objective of
marijuana’s legalization. It should, along with economic
development, be viewed as a subsidiary benefit. The
legalization of cannabis will produce considerable eco-
nomic benefits in the form of new industries and new
commodities. Legalization will produce jobs, incomes, and
tax revenue. Lower prices will also reallocate consumer
savings, diverting money now spent on marijuana to other
forms of economic activity.
More importantly, a competitive market offers greater
benefits with respect to public policy, especially the reduc-
tion of teenage use through restricted access and the elim-
ination of profit incentives for teen-to-teen sales. Teenagers
will continue to use marijuana, but as Roffman points out,
the overall social environment under legalization, with re-
spect to public health, will be far better than it is under
prohibition. A competitive market provides the opportunity
to maximize those benefits. Most marijuana users, the
majority of the subculture associated with marijuana use,
are resistant to a corporate oligopoly taking over control of
marijuana production and distribution in the United States.
It is time to enlist this community in the pursuit of the
public interest. To this end, it is recommended that the on-
going discussion over an appropriate regulatory framework
be expanded to include the issue of corporate social respon-
sibility and the extent to which this can be augmented by
many of the shared values of the existing subculture of
marijuana users.
The reason marijuana legalization is gaining in popu-
larity is recognition that prohibition has failed to control
the market. The solution to the challenge of creating a
legal, regulated market in marijuana is to let it grow. Let
the market grow, an open, competitive market with high
levels of participation and lower prices.Competing interests
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